


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SPECIAL REPORT

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING AT OTTAWA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MORI/CDF Pages 1-6

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THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING AT OTTAWA

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's ministerial meeting convening at Ottawa from 22 to 24 May will probably be substantially more significant than indicated by its public agenda, which provides only for consideration of the secretary general's annual political appraisal and the usual review of the international situation. Of much greater import will be the discussions concerning the organization of an Interallied Nuclear Force (IANF) as proposed last December at Nassau, and related matters. A compromise has apparently been reached between divergent French and British views on the manner of dealing with this subject at Ottawa.

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Subjects for Discussion

The military aspects of the conference are indicated by the presence, for the second consecutive year, of defense ministers at a spring meeting which is traditionally attended by foreign ministers alone. Also lending import to the meeting is the fact that a portion of Secretary General Stikker's appraisal consists of a special report on NATO defense policy.

While Stikker's paper touches on the ever-present problems of long-range planning and of conventional forces, its main concern is with North Atlantic Council (NAC) discussion over the last five months in following up the Nassau proposals for a NATO Nuclear Force (NNF). Preliminary reports by the US to NAC on its bilateral discussions with individual NATO members on the Multilateral Force (MLF), which is one com-

ponent of the NNF, have indicated that some countries are interested in pursuing the proposal for a mix-manned sea-borne missile force, while others have reservations.

At Ottawa, the conferees are expected to approve the steps planned in organizing the IANF, the other component. This would implement the idea put forward in paragraph 6 of the Kennedy-Macmillan Nassau agreements. It was felt that an immediate start on providing for closer association among NATO countries in nuclear policy and planning might help to satisfy complaints from the nonnuclear nations at being left largely in the dark about matters of vital interest to them. The IANF was also considered to have advantage as a kind of pilot project for the establishment later of the MLF. In contrast with the IANF, which is essentially a rearrangement


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of existing forces, the MLF is an entirely new concept involving many complex problems whose solution will require protracted negotiations.

IANF Controversy

While some of these problems also apply to the IANF, the major difficulty in connection with the Ottawa meeting has stemmed from the wide British-French divergence on the manner in which the IANF was to be presented, particularly in the Ottawa communiqué.



Although London and Paris retreated slightly from their extreme positions, the consensus in NAC was that some kind of preliminary agreement was imperative in order to avoid an open rift at Ottawa. With this objective, Stikker, in conjunction with the French, British,

and American NATO representatives, worked out the text of a statement of ministerial action on the nuclear forces for suggested use in the communiqué. By substituting the word "organize" for "create" and not using the formal IANF designation, they overcame main French objections.

Another French condition was the omission in the statement of any reference to the secretary general's Special Report on NATO Defense Policy, which Paris held would amount to official recognition of a personal document. Stikker had insisted all along that the report--which includes an outline of the steps to be taken in setting up the IANF--was his own production and responsibility, even though he circulated it for discussion and comment. Since formal NAC action on it was inhibited by its anomalous status, the French tactic effectively bypassed the whole report, parts of which Paris could not agree to--presumably those referring to future plans including the MLF.

IANF Composition

The IANF as presently planned is to consist of those nationally owned nuclear delivery forces--including British V-bombers and three US Polaris submarines--which are now, or may in future be, assigned by member governments to NATO and whose wartime targets are planned in advance by the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR). It would include tactical strike aircraft

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and long-range bombardment missiles, but would exclude all "battlefield" weapons systems such as Honest Johns and Corporals deployed in support of the forward ground forces.

In view of the imminence of the Ottawa meeting and the danger of a French veto, it was clear from NAC discussions that controversial changes had to be ruled out. Wherever possible, therefore, conditions now governing these forces are to remain in effect--i.e., they would continue under national ownership and be equipped with US- or UK-owned warheads under present custodial arrangements. Political control is subject to existing procedures, taking into account guidelines laid down at the Athens ministerial meeting a year ago. Command arrangements remain unchanged, although the supreme commander, General Lemnitzer, expects that some readjustments in his staff structure will be required.

If the French and other allies question these terms, it could further upset arrangements for a satisfactory communiqué at Ottawa.

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Since most of the tactical strike aircraft are already assigned to SACEUR, "membership" in the IANF would be automatic for those forces--including two French squadrons stationed in Germany--unless explicitly withdrawn by the individual country. Reluctance to take this negative action may have contributed to the French decision not to veto the arrangement. Another factor may have been De Gaulle's belated

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recognition of some merit in the IANF proposal. French officials acknowledged that the assignment of the US and UK strategic forces would increase SACEUR's nuclear power and welcomed the prospect of access to additional information on nuclear matters.

Other Steps

The need to strengthen alliance solidarity, recognized last December at Nassau, has been underlined by subsequent unsettling events such as the EEC fiasco, the Franco-German treaty, and general European apprehension over possible cut-backs in US forces on the Continent. General Lemnitzer reported on 6 May the widespread concern on this score encountered on his recent trips to NATO countries. The continuing uncooperative attitude of the French Government toward the alliance has contributed a further anxiety.

It is hoped that other steps--with psychological and political implications--envisaged in the IANF plan may promote more cohesion. These measures are designed to give practical effect to greater participation by NATO members in nuclear planning. SACEUR is to provide national political and military

authorities with more extensive nuclear information of particular concern to their specific countries. A new post of deputy for nuclear affairs will be established on the SHAPE staff under SACEUR, to be held in rotation by different nationalities. The first incumbent is expected to be Dutch. Moreover, for the first time allied officers will be included in SACEUR's liaison group at Omaha which coordinates nuclear planning between Allied Command Europe and the US.

Political Items

Apart from the IANF matter, no special political decisions are foreseen at this meeting, although ministers are free to raise any questions they wish. The need to improve political consultation, which has been cited and discussed on several occasions during past months, may result in scheduling some informal and restricted sessions to stimulate more spontaneous and frank exchanges of views. Even though there are many widespread trouble spots which could claim attention, the review of the world situation may have to be cut short in order to allow time for defense matters. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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